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Repetition priming can be driven by the encoding and retrieval of stimulus–response (S–R) bindings.
When a previously encoded S–R binding is retrieved, and is congruent with the response currently
required, it can bias response-selection processes towards selecting the retrieved response, resulting
in facilitation. Previous studies have used classiﬁcation tasks at retrieval. Here, two (or more) response
options are competing, and it is likely that any evidence (e.g., an S–R binding) in favour of one option
will be utilized to effect a decision. Thus, S–R effects are likely to be seen when using such a task. It is
unclear whether such effects can be seen under conditions of higher response certainty, when partici-
pants are explicitly cued to make a response. Across two experiments, evidence for a modulating inﬂu-
ence of S–R bindings is seen despite using a response cueing method at retrieval to minimize response
uncertainty and despite stimuli being task irrelevant. Finally, the results suggest that responses within
these S–R bindings are coded at the level of left versus right hand, and not a more ﬁne-grained within-
hand thumb versus index ﬁnger. The results underline the resilience of S–R effects, suggesting that they
are present even under conditions where no explicit object-oriented decision is required.
Keywords: Repetition priming; Response selection; Stimulus–response learning.
Our interactions with everyday objects are strongly
modulated by experience. We are often faster and
more accurate at interacting with familiar than with
novel objects. In an experimental setting, this experi-
ence-dependent change in reaction time (RT) or
accuracy is referred to as repetition priming
(Richardson-Klavehn&Bjork, 1988).Multiple learn-
ing mechanisms are thought to contribute to rep-
etition priming (Henson, 2003); however, it is clear
that the encoding and retrieval of stimulus–response
(S–R) bindings play a signiﬁcant role in object-
related repetition priming (see Henson, Eckstein,
Waszak, Frings, & Horner, 2014, for a review).
S–R theories of repetition priming propose that
when a stimulus is ﬁrst encountered, a direct associ-
ation or binding forms between the stimulus pre-
sented (e.g., a common object such as a mug) and
the response made to the object (e.g., a reaching
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action with the right hand; Hommel, 2004; Logan,
1990). When the stimulus is encountered for a
second time, the previously encoded S–R binding
is rapidly retrieved. This retrieval is thought to
either bypass the processes required on ﬁrst presen-
tation (speeding RTs relative to ﬁrst presentation;
Logan, 1988, 1990) or bias response-selection pro-
cesses towards performing the action previously
made (Horner & Henson, 2009; Race, Badre, &
Wagner, 2010; Race, Shanker, & Wagner, 2009).
This bias to perform a speciﬁc action can lead to
facilitation when the same action is required (e.g.,
reaching with the right hand) but not when a differ-
ent action is required (e.g., reaching with the left
hand). Indeed, when a different response is required,
interference effects can be seen where RTs are slower
than if the object was experimentally novel (e.g.,
Horner & Henson, 2011, 2012; Waszak &
Hommel, 2007). Thus, in situations where responses
are consistent across repetitions, S–R learning allows
for rapid and efﬁcient interactions with common
objects. Though S–R theories typically relate to
associations between task-relevant stimuli and the
response made in relation to those stimuli, here I
use the term “S–R binding” more broadly to refer
to any association between a stimulus (regardless of
task relevance) and a response executed in the pres-
ence of that stimulus.
S–R contributions to repetition priming have
been shown across multiple experimental method-
ologies. Much of the literature has focused on S–R
effects for attended task-relevant stimuli. At one
end of the spectrum, they have been shown to last
across many minutes and intervening stimuli in the
case of perceptual or semantic classiﬁcation of
objects (e.g., Denkinger & Koutstaal, 2009;
Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, & Schacter, 2004;
Horner & Henson, 2008; Soldan, Clarke,
Colleran, & Kuras, 2012; Waszak & Hommel,
2007), words (e.g., Dennis & Schmidt, 2003; Race
et al., 2009), and faces (Valt, Klein, & Boehm,
2014). At the other end, S–R effects have been
shown under immediate repetition conditions (i.e.,
no intervening stimuli) for simplistic stimuli (e.g.,
single X or O letters) under simple classiﬁcation
tasks (e.g., is the stimulus an X or O; Hommel,
1998; Hommel & Colzato, 2004). Importantly,
despite differences in stimuli, lag, and task, both
approaches have typically utilized a (binary) object-
oriented classiﬁcation task at retrieval.
More recently, attention has turned to whether
bindings can be formed between responses and task-
irrelevant or unattended stimuli (e.g., Hommel,
2005; Hommel & Colzato, 2004; Rothermund,
Wentura, & De Houwer, 2005). Here, multiple
stimuli are simultaneously presented at encoding
(and retrieval), and the participant is required to pay
attention and respond to the task-relevant stimulus
whilst ignoring the task-irrelevant stimulus (the “dis-
tractor”). Interestingly, S–R effects can be seen
when stimuli presented as distractors at encoding are
attended and task relevant at retrieval (Rothermund
et al., 2005). In other words, on ﬁrst presentation,
an S–R binding is formed between the distractor
stimulus and the response made to the simultaneously
presented attended stimulus. Attention and task rel-
evance have also been manipulated at retrieval.
Following the ﬁndings of Rothermund et al., it has
been shown that distractor stimuli at encoding can
modulate repetition priming at retrieval even when
the stimulus remains a distractor (Frings, Moeller,
& Rothermund, 2013; Frings, Rothermund, &
Wentura, 2007). Such distractor-to-distractor effects
suggest that, under certain experimental conditions,
attention and task relevance are not necessary for
both the encoding and the retrieval of S–R bindings
(though seeMoeller & Frings, 2014). As in the litera-
ture for attended stimuli, these studies typically utilize
a classiﬁcation task at retrieval (e.g., the colour of a
word), typically binary (e.g., Rothermund et al.,
2005), though also four distinct response options
have been used (e.g., Frings et al., 2007).
Here I asked whether S–R effects can be seen
when not using an object-oriented classiﬁcation
task at encoding or retrieval. Classiﬁcation of a
stimulus at retrieval (e.g., is the object man-made
or natural?) may increase the probability of seeing
S–R effects due to increased response uncertainty.
If a decision between two (or more) competing
response options is required, the retrieval of a pre-
vious S–R binding may have a larger effect on RTs
than in situations where there is little response com-
petition/uncertainty (e.g., if the response is given to
the participant). Hommel (1998) introduced a
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manipulation in which, prior to stimulus onset, a
response cue is presented (e.g., an arrow pointing
to the right). The participant is required to make
this cued response when the main stimulus is pre-
sented (the response trigger). This manipulation
allows for the encoding of arbitrary S–R bindings
where there is no obvious relationship between
the stimulus presented and response made.
Importantly, it means no classiﬁcation task is made
to the stimulus itself. Although this manipulation
has been previously used at encoding, it has not
been used at retrieval. Here, I used a response
cueing method at both encoding and retrieval to
avoid the presence of a classiﬁcation task. The pres-
ence of S–R effects in a situation of high response
certainty (using response cues) would provide stron-
ger evidence that the automatic retrieval of S–R
bindings can modulate behaviour even in situations
where there would appear to be little behavioural
beneﬁt in retrieving a prior response.
Further to testing for S–R effects without the
use of a classiﬁcation task, the present studies
focused on whether S–R effects can be seen
across longer lags (e.g., Horner & Henson, 2009),
despite objects being task-irrelevant at both encod-
ing and retrieval (e.g., Frings et al., 2007). Here,
task relevance was deﬁned as objects not being
informative with regard to what response to make
and when to make it. Objects were simply on the
screen at the same time as responses were made
at encoding and retrieval. The majority of studies
manipulating task relevance have used an immedi-
ate repetition design (i.e., there was a short lag
between repetitions with no intervening stimuli).
Here, experiments used a study–test design more
similar to long-lag repetition priming experiments
(e.g., Horner & Henson, 2009) where objects are
ﬁrst presented in a single “study” block and then
repeated in a “test” block with other novel stimuli.
Repetition priming is deﬁned as the difference
between the repeated and novel stimuli in the test
phase. Note that although the current experiments
used a study–test design, relatively few stimuli were
presented during each study–test block. Therefore
the lag between repetitions of stimuli was relatively
short compared to long-lag paradigms (though
longer than immediate repetition paradigms).
In Experiment 1, a novel repetition priming
paradigm is presented where visual objects are
task irrelevant at both study and test (see
Figure 1). At study, participants are cued to
prepare a response by the location of a red square.
An object is then centrally presented; however, par-
ticipants are only required to respond when a red
square is presented around the object. Thus, the
object neither cues nor triggers the response but is
simply concomitant with the response. At test, a
single object is shown, and following a brief
period of time a red arrow both cues and triggers
a response. Again, this means the object does not
tell the participant either how or when to
respond. For the repeated stimuli, responses
either were the same (congruent) or were switched
(incongruent) between study and test. RTs for
these conditions were compared to RTs for novel
objects at test. Faster RTs were seen for congruent
than for incongruent and novel objects, consistent
with the encoding and retrieval of S–R bindings.
In Experiment 2, I manipulated the incongruent
condition such that participants either switched
hand (e.g., left to right hand index ﬁnger press)
or switched digit (e.g., index to thumb right hand
press). S–R effects were only seen when switching
hand (not digit within hand) suggesting that S–R
bindings in the present paradigm are coded at the
level of hand but perhaps not digit within hand.
Thus, across two experiments I present novel evi-
dence for (a) the encoding of S–R bindings
between task-irrelevant objects and arbitrary
responses, (b) the retrieval of such S–R bindings
when objects at test are task irrelevant, (c) the pres-
ence of S–R effects without using an object-
oriented classiﬁcation task at encoding or retrieval,
and (d) the representational level of responses
within such arbitrary S–R bindings.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
A total of 33 participants (22 female) were recruited
through the online UCL Psychology Subject Pool.
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All participants gave informed consent and were
reimbursed for their time (£7.50). They had a
mean age of 23.5 years (SD= 3.5). By self-report,
one participant was left-handed and the remainder
right-handed. The experiment was approved by the
UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience
Departmental Research Ethics Committee (ICH-
AH-PWB-2-10-13a).
Materials
A total of 240 colour images of common objects
were used, as in Horner and Henson (2008). The
images subtended approximately 3° of visual angle
when presented on the computer screen. They
were divided into three sets of 80 images. Each
set was assigned to one of the three conditions
(congruent, incongruent, and novel), with the
assignment of sets to conditions counterbalanced
across participants in a Latin square design.
Stimulus presentation was controlled by the
Cogent toolbox within MATLAB. Responses
were made on a QWERTY keyboard.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of 40 study–test blocks.
Stimuli in each study–test block were unique (i.e.,
stimuli were not repeated across blocks). At
study, four object images were paired with one of
the four response options: top left, top right,
bottom left, bottom right. Thus, for each study–
test block there was a one-to-one stimulus-to-
response mapping. The study phase was split into
three mini-blocks, with each object shown once
in each mini-block (presentation order of objects
was random within each mini-block). The stimu-
lus-to-response relationship was constant across
study. As such, each stimulus–response pairing
was repeated three times at study. There were a
total of 12 trials in each study phase.
Study trials began with a centrally placed ﬁx-
ation cross for 500 ms (see Figure 1).
Surrounding the ﬁxation cross were four black
squares, shown to the upper left, upper right,
lower left, and lower right of ﬁxation. One of the
squares then turned red for 1000 ms, whilst the
others remained black. The location of the red
square told the participant which of the four
Figure 1. Trial structure for study and test phases of Experiments 1–2. During the study phase, participants prepared a response according to the
location of the red square (one of four response options). They were then presented with a single object and, following a certain interval, were
required to respond when the object was surrounded by a red square. During the test phase, participants were shown an object for a variable
period of time and were required to respond when cued by a red arrow. Each study and test trial ended with a 1000-ms blank screen. The test
phase trial is an example of a congruent item, as the participant responded “top right” at both study and test. Red squares and arrows are shown
here in light grey.
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possible response options they should prepare to
make (i.e., they didn’t respond at this point). The
top left response (Q) was mapped to the left
index ﬁnger, top right (]) to the right index
ﬁnger, bottom left (Z) to the left thumb, and
bottom right (/) to the right thumb.
The squares were removed from the screen, and
a ﬁxation cross was shown for a further 500 ms. A
single object was then presented in the middle of
the screen (participants were required to ﬁxate cen-
trally throughout). Participants were told to “pay
attention to the object”; however, it was made
clear to them that the objects were not task relevant
(i.e., the objects had no bearing on when or how the
participants should respond). For the ﬁrst two pre-
sentations of the object, after 500 ms, 750 ms, or
1000 ms (randomly selected on each trial), a red
square surrounding the object appeared.
Participants were instructed to make the prepared
response as soon as the red square appeared “as
quickly and as accurately as possible”. On the
third object presentation, the surrounding red
square appeared at the same time as object presen-
tation. Participants were given up to 1000 ms to
respond following the presentation of the sur-
rounding red square. On button press, the object
and surrounding red square were replaced by a
blank screen lasting 1000 ms.
This red square response trigger was used for
three reasons: (a) to ensure that participants were
not responding to the presentation of the object
(i.e., to make objects task irrelevant), (b) to delay
response on the ﬁrst two trials to ensure that par-
ticipants had adequate time to recognize each
object, and (c) to ensure that the ﬁnal response
was triggered at the same time as object presen-
tation. The idea was to increase the probability
that an arbitrary S–R binding would form
between the object presented and response made
despite the object being task irrelevant.
At test, each of the four objects were presented
once, as well as two further novel objects. Two of
the “old” objects were assigned to the congruent
condition and two to the incongruent condition.
For congruent objects, participants were required
to make the same response at test as that made at
study. For incongruent objects, participants were
required to make the opposite response at test to
that made at study. For example, if the object was
associated with the “top left” response at study, par-
ticipants would be required to make a “bottom
right” response at test (left index ﬁnger to right
thumb). The two novel objects were randomly
assigned to one of the four possible response
options.
Test trials began with a 500-ms ﬁxation cross
followed by the presentation of one of the six
objects at ﬁxation (see Figure 1). After 300 ms,
500 ms, or 700 ms (randomly selected on each
trial), four arrows appeared pointing to the top
left, top right, bottom left, and bottom right of
the screen. One of the arrows was in red, the
others in black. The red arrow told the participant
which of the four responses to make. Arrows were
used at test to minimize the perceptual overlap
between response cues at study and test. The
jitter between object presentation and response
cue (i.e., the arrows) was to ensure that participants
were responding to the response cue onset (i.e.,
they could not predict on a trial-to-trial basis
when they would be required to respond).
Participants were required to respond as soon as
the response cue appeared “as quickly and as accu-
rately as possible”, up to a maximum of 1500 ms.
On button press, the object and arrows were
replaced by a blank screen lasting 1000 ms. Prior
to the experiment, participants performed a single
study–test block as practice.
Statistical analyses
Prior to calculating RTs (ms), for each individual
participant, I excluded trials that were incorrect,
or were faster or slower than 2 standard deviations
from the condition-speciﬁc mean RT. For study
and test phases, I report within-subject analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) for both RT and accuracy.
For the main effects and interactions within each
ANOVA, I report partial eta squared effects sizes
(h2p). Signiﬁcant main effects with more than two
conditions, and interactions, from ANOVAs were
further interrogated with paired t tests. For these
t tests, I report Cohen’s d as the mean difference
between conditions divided by the mean standard
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deviation across conditions (dav; Cumming, 2012;
Lakens, 2013).
Results
Study phase
Study phase accuracy and RT data are shown in
Table 1. At study I analysed accuracy and RTs for
objects that were assigned to the congruent and
incongruent conditions (i.e., that subsequently
differ at test). I performed 2× 3 within-subject
ANOVAs with factors congruency (congruent vs.
incongruent) and repetition (ﬁrst–third object pres-
entation). A 2× 3 ANOVA on accuracy failed to
reveal any signiﬁcant effects or an interaction,
Fs, 0.40, ps. .61, h2p , .02. Following exclusion
of incorrect trials, a further 5% of trials were
excluded as RT outliers (see Method for exclusion
criteria) prior to analysis of the RT data. A similar
ANOVA on RTs revealed a main effect of rep-
etition, F(1.1, 36.1)= 97.23, p, .001, h2p = .75.
This effect was characterized by slower RTs for
Presentation 3 than for Presentation 1, t(32)=
10.09, p, .001, d= 1.30, and Presentation 2,
t(32)= 10.05, p, .001, d= 1.42, with no differ-
ence between Presentations 1 and 2, t(32)= 1.44,
p= .16, d= 0.08. This is probably a function of
the decreased time between the initial response cue
and the appearance of the response trigger (i.e., the
red square surrounding the object; see Method).
Importantly, no main effect of congruency nor an
interaction between congruency and repetition
were seen, Fs, 1.4, ps. .27, h2p , .04. As such,
no accuracy or RT difference was seen between con-
gruent and incongruent objects at study.
Test phase
Test phase accuracy andRT data are shown inTable
2 and Figure 2. Accuracy andRT data were analysed
with a one-way within-subjects ANOVA with the
conditions congruent, incongruent, and novel. No
signiﬁcant effect was seen in the accuracy data, F
(2.0, 62.4)= 1.62, p= .21, h2p = .05. Following
exclusion of incorrect trials, a further 5% of trials
were excluded as RT outliers prior to analysis of
Table 1. Mean for accuracy and RTs during the study phase of
Experiments 1 and 2 across the congruent and incongruent
conditions and Presentations 1–3
Experiment
Presentation
1
Presentation
2
Presentation
3
Experiment 1
Accuracy
Congruent .96 (.06) .96 (.06) .96 (.05)
Incongruent .96 (.06) .96 (.06) .96 (.06)
RT
Congruent 320 (56) 315 (51) 410 (89)
Incongruent 317 (56) 314 (49) 415 (92)
Experiment 2
Accuracy
Congruent .96 (.09) .96 (.09) .96 (.09)
Incongruent digit .96 (.09) .96 (.10) .95 (.10)
Incongruent hand .97 (.08) .96 (.09) .96 (.09)
RT
Congruent 328 (44) 313 (37) 421 (71)
Incongruent digit 324 (40) 315 (40) 414 (71)
Incongruent hand 328 (45) 319 (40) 420 (74)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Accuracy: proportion
correct. RT = reaction time, in ms.
Table 2. Mean for accuracy and RTs during the test phase of
Experiments 1 and 2 across the congruent and incongruent and novel
conditions and response cue to object presentation intervals
Experiment 300 ms 500 ms 700 ms
Experiment 1
Accuracy
Congruent .97 (.04) .97 (.03) .96 (.06)
Incongruent .96 (.06) .98 (.03) .97 (.05)
Novel .98 (.04) .97 (.04) .98 (.04)
RTs
Congruent 490 (77) 471 (79) 467 (72)
Incongruent 493 (78) 472 (81) 479 (77)
Novel 503 (83) 473 (75) 472 (83)
Experiment 2
Accuracy
Congruent .96 (.09) .97 (.06) .96 (.13)
Incongruent digit .95 (.12) .96 (.09) .97 (.07)
Incongruent hand .96 (.12) .97 (.09) .95 (.10)
Novel .97 (.08) .96 (.12) .96 (.08)
RT
Congruent 480 (48) 459 (39) 467 (48)
Incongruent digit 485 (53) 461 (45) 459 (48)
Incongruent hand 487 (53) 466 (53) 471 (54)
Novel 498 (54) 468 (49) 460 (52)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Accuracy: proportion
correct. RT = reaction time, in ms.
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the RT data. A signiﬁcant effect was seen in the RT
data, F(1.9, 59.3)= 4.59, p, .05, h2p = .13.
Whereas RTs in the congruent condition were sig-
niﬁcantly faster than those in the incongruent, t
(32)= 2.67, p, .05, d= 0.09, and novel, t(32)=
2.31, p, .05 , d= 0.08, conditions, no difference
was seen between the incongruent and novel con-
ditions, t(32)= 0.10, p= .92, d, 0.01. Thus, par-
ticipantswere fasterwhenmaking the same response
to a speciﬁc object at study and test than when they
were either required to switch response to a speciﬁc
object or required to respond to a novel object.
To ensure that participants were not predicting
when to respond at test, I varied the time between
object presentation and response cue (red arrow).
The interval was 300 ms, 500 ms, or 700 ms, ran-
domly selected on each trial regardless of condition.
To ensure that the differences seen between the con-
gruent condition and both the incongruent and the
novel condition were consistent across the three
object presentation to response cue intervals, I con-
ducted a 3 (congruency: congruent, incongruent,
and novel)× 3 (interval: 300 ms, 500 ms, and 700
ms) ANOVA . For accuracy, no main effects or
interactions were seen, Fs, 2.0, ps. .15,
h2p , .06. For RTs, although a signiﬁcant effect of
interval was seen, F(1.8, 58.4)= 57.40, p, .001,
h2p = .64, revealing slower RTs for shorter intervals,
no interaction was seen, F(3.0, 96.3)= 1.82,
p= .15, h2p = .05; the main effect of congruency
was again signiﬁcant, F(1.8, 58.8)= 4.09, p, .05,
h2p = .11. Thus, the difference between the three
main conditions did not signiﬁcantly differ as a func-
tion of the object presentation to response cue inter-
val. However, caution is warranted given that the
interval time was selected randomly on each trial,
regardless of condition. As such, trials for each con-
dition may not have been evenly allocated to the
three interval times within each participant.
Discussion
Experiment 1 introduced a novel experimental
paradigm to test for S–R contributions to repetition
priming. The objects at study and test were entirely
task irrelevant in that they did not inform the par-
ticipants as to how or when to respond (though
participants were told to “attend to the objects”).
Further, the paradigm avoids the use of an object-
oriented classiﬁcation task at both encoding and
retrieval. Despite this, participants still showed an
S–R congruency effect. Participants reacted more
quickly to objects seen at study if the same response
was required at test as that at study than if a differ-
ent response was required. Further, no difference
was seen between previously seen objects that
required a response switch between study and test
relative to novel objects at test.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 sought to replicate and extend the
ﬁndings of Experiment 1. Speciﬁcally, I was
Figure 2. Repetition priming (repeated–novel; ms) for congruent and incongruent conditions across Experiments 1–2. *p, .05. **p, .01.
ns= not signiﬁcant.
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interested in the level of response representation
encoded within S–R bindings. Given the task has
no semantic or classiﬁcation component, responses
being cued simply by squares or arrows, the
“response” that becomes associated with each
object at study is likely to be relative low level—
that is, closely associated with a speciﬁc motoric
action. In Experiment 1, incongruent responses at
test switched both the hand (e.g., left to right)
and the digit (e.g., ﬁnger to thumb). In
Experiment 2, I introduced two incongruent con-
ditions: (a) incongruent hand and (b) incongruent
digit. In the incongruent hand condition, responses
between study and test switched hand but not digit,
whereas for the incongruent digit condition,
responses switched digit but not hand.
Method
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 with
the following exceptions.
Participants
A total of 32 participants (22 female) participated.
They had a mean age of 22.2 years (SD= 2.9). By
self-report, three participants were left-handed and
the remainder right-handed.
Materials
The 240 object images were split into four sets of
60. Each set was assigned to one of the four con-
ditions—congruent, incongruent hand, incongru-
ent digit, and novel—with the assignment
counterbalanced across participants in a Latin
square design.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of 60 study–test blocks.
For each study phase, three objects were presented
three times each. Each object was assigned to one
of the four possible response options (ensuring
each stimulus–response pairing was unique). At
test, each object from study was presented once,
as well as a single novel trial. One of the objects
from study required the same response at test (con-
gruent), one required a switch in the hand, but not
digit (e.g., from left to right hand, using the index
ﬁnger; incongruent hand), and one required a
switch in digit, but not hand (e.g., from index
ﬁnger to thumb, using the left hand; incongruent
digit). The novel object was randomly assigned
one of the four response options.
Results
Study phase
Study phase accuracy and RT data are shown in
Table 1. Accuracy and RT data were analysed
using 3× 3 within-subject ANOVAs with factors
congruency (congruent, incongruent hand, incon-
gruent digit) and repetition (ﬁrst, second, third).
The accuracy data revealed a main effect of rep-
etition, F(1.9, 59.8)= 3.30, p, .05, h2p = .10,
with decreasing accuracy across presentations. No
main effect of congruency nor an interaction was
present, Fs, 1.2, ps. .33, h2p , .04. Following
exclusion of incorrect trials, a further 5% of trials
were excluded as RT outliers prior to analysis of
the RT data. The RT data also revealed a main
effect of repetition, F(1.1, 34.9)= 96.78,
p, .001, h2p = .76. Similar to Experiment 1,
slower RTs were seen for the third presentation
than for the ﬁrst, t(31)= 9.18, p, .001, d=
1.64, and second, t(31)= 10.89, p, .001, d=
1.89, presentation. However, unlike Experiment
1, we also saw faster RTs for the second than for
the ﬁrst presentation, t(31)= 3.70, p, .01, d=
0.27. Despite a trend, the main effect of con-
gruency was not signiﬁcant, F(2.0, 61.8)= 3.08,
p= .053, h2p = .09, and no interaction was
present, F(3.5, 108.4)= 1.11, p= .35, h2p = .04.
Therefore, replicating Experiment 1, we saw no
differences between the main conditions of interest
at study—as shown by a lack of a main effect of
congruency in both the accuracy and the RT
analyses.
Test phase
Test phase accuracy and RT data are shown in
Table 2 and Figure 2. A one-way ANOVA
across the four main conditions—congruent,
incongruent hand, incongruent digit, and novel—
for the accuracy data failed to reveal a main effect,
F(2.6, 80.0)= 0.66, p= .56, h2p = .02. Following
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exclusion of incorrect trials, a further 5% of trials
were excluded as RT outliers prior to analysis of
the RT data. A main effect was seen when analys-
ing the RT data, F(2.8, 86.7)= 4.26, p, .01,
h2p = .12. Faster RTs were seen in the congruent
condition than in the incongruent hand, t(31)=
2.57, p, .05, d= 0.17, and novel, t(31)= 3.04,
p, .01, d= 0.20, conditions. However, no differ-
ence was seen between the congruent and incon-
gruent digit conditions, t(31)= 1.32, p= .20,
d= 0.08. Replicating Experiment 1, the congruent
condition differed from the incongruent and novel
conditions. However, this only occurred in the
incongruent condition that required a switch in
hand (but not digit) and was not seen when switch-
ing digits (but not hands). Finally, faster RTs were
seen in the incongruent digit than in the novel con-
dition, t(31)= 2.17, p, .05, d= 0.12, whereas no
difference was seen between the incongruent hand
and novel conditions, t(31)= 0.34, p= .74, d=
0.02. However, the ﬁnal comparison between
incongruent hand and incongruent digit did not
reach signiﬁcance, t(31)= 1.48, p= .15, d= 0.09.
As in Experiment 1, I split the accuracy and RT
data according to the object presentation to
response cue interval (300 ms, 500 ms, and 700
ms). A 4× 3 (Congruency× Interval) within-sub-
jects ANOVA on the accuracy data failed to reveal
any main effects or interactions, Fs, 1.7, ps. .19,
h2p , .06. A similar ANOVA on the RT data
revealed a main effect of interval, F(1.8, 56.7)=
28.86, p, .001, h2p = .48, revealing slower RTs
for shorter intervals, and a main effect of con-
gruency, F(2.3, 72.7)= 2.97, p, .05, h2p = .09.
Unexpectedly, I also saw a Congruency× Interval
interaction, F(4.8, 150.3)= 2.37, p, .05,
h2p = .07. This effect appears to be driven by a
greater main effect of congruency for the 300-ms
than for the 700-ms interval (see interexperiment
analyses for further discussion of this issue).
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1: I saw sig-
niﬁcantly faster RTs for objects that required the
same response at study and test than for objects
that required a switch in response (and relative to
novel objects). Extending these results, I show
that this slowing of RT (relative to the congruent
condition) when participants are required to
switch response to a speciﬁc object is only seen
when switching hands (e.g., from left to right
hand) but not when switching digits (e.g., from
index ﬁnger to thumb).
Interexperimental analyses
I performed one ﬁnal analysis to address two
issues: (a) whether the congruency effect was con-
sistent across experiments, and (b) whether the
Congruency× Interval interaction seen in
Experiment 2 (but not in Experiment 1) was con-
sistent across experiments. To address this, I per-
formed a 2× 3× 2 (Congruency× Interval×
Experiment) mixed ANOVA using the congruent
and incongruent conditions from Experiment 1
and the congruent and incongruent hand conditions
from Experiment 2 (given that the results from
Experiment 2 suggest that responses are coded at
the level of hand, but not digit). A main effect of
congruency, with no interaction with experiment
or interval, would suggest that the congruency
effect was consistent across experiments. Further,
if no Congruency× Interval or Congruency×
Interval×Experiment interaction is seen, this
would suggest that the Congruency× Interval
interaction seen in Experiment 2 was perhaps a
Type I error (particularly given the low p-value
and effect size associated with this interaction; see
Experiment 2, Results section).
This ANOVA produced a main effect of con-
gruency, F(1, 63)= 6.02, p, .05, h2p = .09, as
well as a main effect of interval, F(1.9, 120.7)=
30.76, p, .001, h2p = .33. Importantly, no
further main effects or interactions were present,
Fs, 1.14, ps. .32, h2p , .02. To achieve a
power of .8, with the sample size for this analysis,
the effect size would need to be f= 0.22 (equivalent
to h2p = .05; a small-to-medium effect size). Thus,
the interexperimental analysis has the required
power to reveal relatively small effect sizes. The
congruency effect therefore did not signiﬁcantly
differ across experiments, and no evidence could
be found that this congruency effect differed as a
function of the object presentation to response
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cue interval (at least not consistently across exper-
iments). Therefore, across experiments there was
a consistent, though relatively small (∼10 ms;
h2p = .09), RT difference between the congruent
and incongruent conditions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across two experiments, I have provided evidence
for the encoding and retrieval of stimulus–response
(S–R) bindings between a response and a task-irre-
levant stimulus. In Experiment 1, I presented a
novel paradigm that ensured a one-to-one
mapping between stimuli (common objects) and
responses. At encoding and retrieval, objects were
task irrelevant as they were not informative with
regard to what response the participant should
make or when they should make it. Despite this,
RTs were faster for repeated objects when the
same response was made at encoding and retrieval.
When participants were required to switch
responses between study and test, RTs did not
differ relative to when novel objects were presented.
In Experiment 2, this response congruency effect
was replicated but only when participants were
required to switch hands (e.g., from left to right
hand). When switching digit within hand (e.g.,
from index ﬁnger to thumb) RTs did not differ
from when exactly the same response was made
between encoding and retrieval. Thus, I provide
novel evidence for the encoding and retrieval of
stimulus to hand-response mappings during task-
irrelevant conditions.
Whereas the majority of studies investigating
S–R learning have used an object-oriented
(binary) classiﬁcation task at retrieval (and encod-
ing), here using a response cueing method similar
to Hommel (1998), participants were never
required to actively decide how to respond to a
stimulus. Under such response cue conditions,
uncertainty between possible response options is
presumably low. Despite this, the retrieval of S–R
bindings still facilitated behaviour when the
response was repeated between encoding and
retrieval. A similar effect has also been shown
when responses for both the prime and probe
stimulus in an immediate repetition paradigm are
cued at the beginning of the prime–probe trial, pre-
sumably also resulting in conditions of high
response certainty (Giesen & Rothermund, 2014,
Experiment 3). These results suggest that S–R
effects are a ubiquitous phenomenon that can
manifest even under conditions where the retrieval
of a previous response would appear to offer little
behavioural beneﬁt. It should be noted that the
difference in RTs between congruent and incon-
gruent stimuli in the present experiments is small
(∼10 ms) relative to paradigms that use semantic
classiﬁcation of objects (∼60 ms in the case of
Horner & Henson, 2009). This decreased con-
gruency effect may be a result of the faster RTs in
the present studies (,500 ms) relative to semantic
classiﬁcation studies (∼600 to 1000 ms), with less
time for retrieved S–R bindings to modulate
response-selection processes. Importantly, S–R
effects were still seen despite such fast RTs,
suggesting that S–R bindings can be retrieved
rapidly. It is also possible that (separate to RT
differences) increasing response certainty at retrie-
val decreases (though does not eliminate) S–R
effects. Further work directly manipulating
response certainty/competition at retrieval (e.g.,
by varying the coherence in moving random dot
patterns used as response cues) under otherwise
identical encoding and retrieval conditions is
needed to address this possibility.
Another critical manipulation in the present
studies was to ensure that objects were task irrele-
vant at both encoding and retrieval. Showing S–R
effects under such conditions further demonstrates
the ubiquity of this form of object-oriented learn-
ing. Previous research has provided evidence for
mappings between responses and unattended or
task-irrelevant stimuli present during response
onset (e.g., Frings et al., 2007; Rothermund
et al., 2005). However, these experiments only
assessed S–R effects across immediate or short
lags between encoding and retrieval. The exception
to this is Experiment 2b of Frings and Rothermund
(2011), which presented a yellow circle between
presentations of letters (the letters being the
stimuli of experimental interest). Thus, despite
the presence of an intervening stimulus, it was
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consistent across trials and had little perceptual
similarity to the main experimental stimuli. Here,
the number of intervening trials between the last
study presentation and test presentation ranged
from 0 to 8 in Experiment 1 and 0 to 5 in
Experiment 2, with the time between presentation
ranging from 1500 ms to ∼15 s in Experiment 1
and 1500 ms to ∼10 s in Experiment 2. This
suggests that the S–R bindings formed in the
present experiments can, at least, last for several
seconds and are not completely disrupted by
several intervening stimuli.
One key difference between the present studies
and those of Rothermund, Frings and colleagues is
that although the objects in the present studies
were task irrelevant, they were not unattended.
Manipulating attention was not a key aim in the
present studies, and it is probable that attending
to task-irrelevant stimuli increases the likelihood
of seeing S–R effects relative to a strong atten-
tional manipulation. Although S–R effects can
be seen for unattended stimuli, these effects
appear more short-lived. For example, distractor-
to-distractor effects in an immediate repetition
paradigm were seen with a 500-ms lag between
encoding and retrieval, but not when the lag was
increased to 2000 ms (Frings, 2011). Thus,
under strong attentional conditions, S–R bindings
might be relatively short-lived relative to those
formed in the present attended but task-irrelevant
conditions.
One might reasonably ask: “What were partici-
pants doing with the objects, given they were task
irrelevant?” One possibility is that they were com-
pletely ignoring the objects and solely focusing on
the response-cueing task. If so, this would
provide even stronger evidence that S–R effects
can manifest when stimuli are unattended at both
encoding and retrieval. However, it is equally poss-
ible that participants were attending to the objects
and explicitly trying to learn the S–R relationships.
Although a possibility, it is perhaps unlikely given
that participants were told to respond as fast as
possible when the response trigger was presented.
Thus, although the task was relatively easy,
participants will have been highly focused on pre-
paring to respond on trigger onset (as evidenced
by the relatively fast RTs across conditions—i.e.,
,500 ms). Further, this possibility would not
undermine the main argument relating to response
uncertainty—response congruency effects were
seen despite the use of highly salient response
cues at retrieval.
S–R effects were seen only when participants
were required to switch between hands (whilst
keeping the digit constant) but not when required
to switch between digits (whilst keeping the hand
constant). These results are consistent with pre-
vious research suggesting that responses within S–
R bindings can be coded at the level of a motoric
action (e.g., Dennis & Perfect, 2013; Horner &
Henson, 2009). They also relate to ﬁndings that
show that retrieval of S–R bindings can modulate
the onset of lateralized readiness potentials,
thought to reﬂect preparation of a left- or right-
hand movement (Frings, Bermeitinger, &
Gibbons, 2011; Gibbons & Stahl, 2008).
However, previous research did not investigate
the speciﬁcity of these action representations. The
results here suggest that responses within S–R
bindings can be represented at the level of right/
left hand, but perhaps not a more ﬁne-grained
index ﬁnger/thumb within hand, at least in the
context of task-irrelevant conditions. Though the
pairwise comparisons between each incongruent
condition and the congruent and novel conditions
were consistent with facilitation only in the incon-
gruent digit condition, caution is warranted as the
comparison between incongruent hand and incon-
gruent digit did not reach signiﬁcance.
It is possible that different digit arrangements
could produce S–R effects (e.g., from thumb to
ring ﬁnger); however, it is noteworthy that a
recent study found thumb representations in
primary motor cortex to be most distinct from
any of the individual ﬁnger representations
(Diedrichsen, Wiestler, & Ejaz, 2013). Thus, the
thumb to index ﬁnger manipulation is likely to be
one of the least ﬁne-grained within-hand manipu-
lations. Note that it is not that responses in S–R
bindings are solely coded at the level of a motoric
hand action. Many studies have provided evidence
for multiple, more abstract, levels of response rep-
resentation (Denkinger & Koutstaal, 2009;
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Dennis & Perfect, 2013; Horner & Henson, 2009;
Race et al., 2009; Schnyer et al., 2007). Further,
there is ample evidence for bindings between the
stimulus presented and task performed during
stimulus presentation (e.g., Moutsopoulou &
Waszak, 2012; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport,
2003). However, the current results suggest that
the hand might be the lower representational
limit for responses within S–R bindings.
Finally, the response congruency effects in the
present studies were primarily driven by a speed-
ing of RTs in the congruent condition, with no
clear differences present between the incongruent
and novel conditions. Both facilitation (i.e.,
faster RTs for congruent than for novel trials)
and interference (i.e., slower RTs for incongruent
than for novel trials) effects have been seen in the
literature (e.g., Hommel, 1998; Horner &
Henson, 2009, 2011; Rothermund et al., 2005),
and the circumstances under which these oppos-
ing effects emerge appears complex (Waszak &
Hommel, 2007). It is worth noting that other
sources of positive priming, for example percep-
tual/conceptual priming, may also modulate
RTs, diminishing the likelihood of seeing interfer-
ence effects. This unresolved issue would beneﬁt
from computational modelling approaches (e.g.,
Saggar, Miikkulainen, & Schnyer, 2010),
whereby speciﬁc predictions can be made about
the conditions under which facilitation and/or
interference effects emerge.
In sum, I have presented novel evidence for S–R
effects despite using a response cue manipulation
that minimizes response uncertainty/competition
at retrieval. Also, objects were task irrelevant at
both encoding and retrieval, further minimizing
the likelihood of seeing such effects. Thus, S–R
effects can manifest even under conditions where
the encoding and retrieval of S–R bindings would
not appear to be behaviourally beneﬁcial. The
results also provide the ﬁrst evidence that responses
within S–R bindings can be coded at the level of
left/right hand but perhaps not at more ﬁne-
grained motoric representations. The results
therefore underline the automaticity, ubiquity,
and resilience of S–R contributions to repetition
priming.
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